

Critical Dialogue

Constitutional Polarization: A Critical Review of the U.S. Political System. By Josep M. Colomer. London: Routledge, 2023. 156p. \$48.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S153759272400152X

— Maxwell L. Stearns , *University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law*
mstearns@law.umaryland.edu

Josep M. Colomer, a political scientist at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University, has produced an important contribution to the literature on the crisis facing democracy in the United States. *Constitutional Polarization* provides rich historical insight into why our constitutional system scarcely resembles what the Framers envisioned and how intervening developments have threatened our status as a democracy. The book begins with what can helpfully be compared with a high stakes children’s game of telephone, detailing misunderstandings, compounded by miscommunications, at several critical steps affecting the Constitution’s framing. It then recounts prolonged policy shifts alternating between international crises, which tend to unify the country, and peacetime domestic issues, which tend to divide it. What remained constant, Colomer demonstrates, amid unpredictable electoral and policy swings has been a steady, and increasingly threatening, aggrandizement of executive power aided by minority factions with blocking power in a system marked by two increasingly polarized parties.

With notable concision, Colomer deepens our understanding of why our constitutional system sharply differs from the Framers’ imaginings, adding critical and overlooked historical detail. *Constitutional Polarization* also exhibits an internal tension common to the genre—a bold diagnosis coupled with a reticent prescription. Colomer’s explanation is clear: the high bar makes amending the Constitution “unthinkable” (p. 116). Yet following his compelling account of the roots of our crisis, which he grounds in fundamental misconceptions at the Framing, this reviewer hoped Colomer might force readers to confront the urgent need for bold reform.

Colomer’s insightful analysis benefits from comparing a fun children’s party game with the high stakes, increasingly unfun, game of governance. In telephone, several children line up in a row. The first child whispers a complex message to the next in line—“The witches ate

waffles, betwixt and between”—and each child whispers what he or she understood to the next. The amusement comes when the first and last children compare how it all began and ended. But Colomer’s game isn’t amusing.

It starts before the beginning, predating the Constitution by eight decades. In a chapter titled “Montesquieu Did Not Speak English” (p. 19), Colomer ascribes the Framers’ misunderstanding of England to the French philosopher’s book, *The Spirit of Laws*, published in 1748. Montesquieu was an unreliable reporter. He failed to appreciate that the system he described, even then imprecisely, was superseded several decades before his London tour. Because Montesquieu didn’t speak English, he relied on erroneous and outdated characterizations by French-speaking contemporaries.

The distorted messaging took several steps, from the parliamentary system in place at the Framing, to Montesquieu’s descriptions four decades before, to the misimpressions of Montesquieu’s semi-reliable informants of the system displaced from still four decades earlier, to disregarding Montesquieu’s half-hearted disclaimer on accuracy, to a literal mistranslation of “stop” or “brake” as “check” (p. 21). Each miscommunication compounded distortions and compromises that rested less on principle than on arbitrary timelines and external pressures. Rather than construing and conveying a tongue twister, acknowledging the complexity of a changing scheme they hoped to adapt and carry forward, the Framers transformed the twists and turns of English history into a system embraced by no nation before or since.

The Framers believed King George III, beyond a ceremonial figurehead, remained head of government, with the final power to negate, or veto, bills sent by Parliament. In fact, the monarch had last done so in 1708, forty years before Montesquieu published his book. By the time Montesquieu hit London, England had replaced executive independence with parliamentary-executive fusion. Adding to the Framers’ confusion, the monarch continued a policymaking role over the colonies long since abandoned domestically. In England, the monarch accommodated the House of Commons whose leader formed the government.

Although Alexander Hamilton defeated a proposed executive counsel, his plea for monarchy failed (pp. 31-32). Once settled on an elected president, the Framers split

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

1 among three groups on the means by which one would be
2 chosen—in Congress, by the states, or by the people.
3 Colomer envisions the groups playing the childhood game
4 Rock Paper Scissors, experiencing a cycle in which for any
5 option, a majority preferred another (p. 34). Whereas the
6 steps within the telephone game are amply documented,
7 this game requires speculation as we lack the camps’
8 complete preference orderings. Regardless, Colomer
9 explains that exigencies of time yielded an alliance, with
10 those preferring direct elections joining small state repre-
11 sentatives in favor of an Electoral College, whose origins he
12 describes as medieval (p. 34).

13 Colomer adds to the brew other antidemocratic features
14 that further enhance presidential power. These include
15 Senate apportionment, two per state regardless of popula-
16 tion; a winner-take-all Electoral College giving each state
17 the sum of its House and Senate delegations; and Senate
18 ratifications and supermajority veto overrides giving
19 minority factions blocking power. The Senate filibuster
20—which demands a 60 percent majority for cloture, to end
21 debate, and move to a vote—lets a single Senator even
22 from a tiny state effectively block popular legislation.

23 The process for electing the president, the Senate, and,
24 beginning in the 1840s, the House, with individuals
25 representing each district, state, or the nation, produced
26 what the Framers sought to avoid, an entrenched two-
27 party system. Colomer aptly describes the end result as
28 “An Elected King with the Name of President” (p. 29).
29 Even with four-year terms and a two-term limit, after the
30 Twenty-Second Amendment, features providing partisan
31 minorities with blocking power have come to dominate
32 imagined institutional rivalries. The end result systemat-
33 ically empowered a single office—the presidency—
34 beyond any specific White House occupant. The presi-
35 dent’s vast and growing powers belie the Framers’ insis-
36 tence that the branch motivating the greatest institutional
37 jealousy—to the point of demanding a Solomonic split—
38 ever was Congress.

39 Colomer divides the relevant history, in the aftermath of
40 the Framing, into four periods: the first seven presidential
41 elections (broad consensus, culminating in the era of good
42 feelings), 1824–1916 (internal agitation with discord over
43 slavery, Reconstruction, and the aftermath); 1932–1988
44 (the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War),
45 and the post-Cold War period since 1992 (growing inter-
46 nal policy divisiveness) (p. 83). However one divides our
47 history, Colomer shows that the underlying dynamics,
48 whether marked by internal divisions or external threats,
49 have let the president emerge ever more powerful.

50 A renowned scholar with deep expertise in foreign
51 affairs, Colomer amply supports his claim of a super-
52 charged presidency. An office whose portfolio began with
53 four cabinet positions—State, War, Treasury, and Attor-
54 ney General (p. 47)—has multiplied nearly fourfold, to
55 fifteen. Even that fails to capture the remarkable scope of

56 presidential powers. The president leads one of the only
57 two parties with a chance of succeeding to that high office,
58 making countless aspiring politicians dependent on his
59 goodwill. The sheer breath of presidential appointment
60 power is overwhelming. Beyond cabinet posts, which
61 require Senate advice and consent, the president appoints
62 over 100 “Czars,” with powers covering extraordinarily
63 broad policy domains, none of whom require Senate
64 approval. Over its entire history, the presidency has issued
65 15,434 Executive Orders, averaging one per week (p. 47),
66 and 97% of presidential vetoes have held (p. 42).

67 With Senate approval, the president appoints federal
68 judges, who unlike cabinet officials or policy czars, hold
69 life tenure. This includes appointments to the Supreme
70 Court, which holds final say on matters of constitutional
71 interpretation and, often, given minority blocking power,
72 on statutory interpretation. These anti-democratic checks
73—Senate apportionment, the high bar for overriding
74 presidential vetoes, Senate filibuster and cloture rules—
75 invite presidents to aggrandize power, knowing someone
76 representing even a minuscule minority of the population
77 can incapacitate Congress as a meaningful check.

78 The Framers envisioned avoiding political parties in
79 favor of yet another Rock Paper Scissors game, whereby
80 each branch could defeat, or be defeated by, another.
81 Instead, they unwittingly produced a game dominated
82 by two parties whose centers, or modes, have grown
83 increasingly far apart, thereby compromising electoral
84 accountability and further enhancing executive powers
85 (pp. 81-82).

86 Colomer’s several prescriptions embed tensions when
87 contrasted with his bold diagnosis. His proposed remedies
88 include increased voting access and turnout; open pri-
89 maries, top-two primary runoffs, and ranked-choice vot-
90 ing; improved inter-branch cooperation; and honoring
91 subsidiarity, which he defines as pressing issues down or
92 up to the appropriate level of governmental decision-
93 making (pp. 115-28). It’s not possible to assess each
94 proposal, and I’ve discussed several elsewhere. Here I’ll
95 observe that none tackle the twin pathologies Colomer
96 powerfully identifies as the root of our constitutional crisis:
97 presidentialism and an increasingly polarized two-party
98 system. I agree with Colomer that beneath our two major
99 parties are five to six natural parties: Democrats, Pro-
100 gressives, Republicans, America First, Green, and Liber-
101 tarian (p. 73). But recognizing implicit parties isn’t
102 enough. The challenge lies in forging institutions that let
103 such parties emerge and thrive, thereby improving politi-
104 cal accountability, blunting extremism, and meaningfully
105 checking widening executive power.

106 Colomer ascribes the roots of our crisis to the most basic
107 misunderstandings, so much so that the Framers’ scheme
108 has never been successfully replicated anywhere in the
109 world. His powerful diagnosis demands as effective a cure.
110 Some of his proposals are meritorious, such as encouraging

1 greater political engagement and better calibrating policy-
2 making based on institutional competence. But for those,
3 and others, to happen, we first need a genuinely functional
4 multiparty democracy that checks against presidential
5 aggrandizement without fear of reprisal from each side's
6 increasingly strident base. Profound misunderstandings set
7 our threatened scheme into motion. For U.S. democracy to
8 endure and thrive, we must now correct the Framers'
9 unforced errors—presidentialism and the two-party system.

10 Colomer's book is a major contribution to the literature
11 on our constitutional crisis. Our job remains devising
12 remedies worthy of his powerful historical account.

13
14
15 **Response to Maxwell L. Stearns' Review of**
16 ***Constitutional Polarization: A Critical Review of the***
17 ***U.S. Political System***

18 doi:10.1017/S1537592724001646

19  — Josep M. Colomer 

20
21 Juan J. Linz initiated the modern critique of the United
22 States political system and its imitators by warning about
23 “the perils of presidentialism” and praising “the virtues of
24 parliamentarism” (especially in his 1990 article for *Journal*
25 *of Democracy* and later in his 1994 book, *The Failure of*
26 *Presidential Democracy*, with Arturo Valenzuela). My
27 point is that these two institutional systems can be better
28 labeled as separation of powers and fusion of powers or
29 parliamentarism (to follow Walter Bagehot's nomencla-
30 tor). “Presidentialism” is not an institution but an anom-
31 alous behavior in an institutional system of separation of
32 powers; as it favors the concentration of powers in one of
33 the institutions, it generates institutional conflict with the
34 separate congressional branch.

35 My book is subtitled “a critical review” of the
36 U.S. political system, while Maxwell Stearns' book is a
37 proposal for its transformation. He says that my “powerful
38 diagnosis demands as effective a cure.” I agree, and in the
39 last chapter of my book, I suggest three possible lines of
40 behavior that could improve the current system's perfor-
41 mance without major institutional reforms. First, improv-
42 ing voting with procedures already spread at the local and
43 state levels, such as open primaries with a top-two runoff.
44 Second, reinforcing cooperation between the Cabinet and
45 Congress by generalizing the Secretaries' delivery of period-
46 ical accounts of their job to Congress. And third, more
47 overlooked and more important, reconsidering some divi-
48 sions of powers between the federal government and the
49 states to diminish the confrontation on certain issues that
50 may be more consensually settled at lower institutional
51 levels. The subsidiarity criterion states that whatever a
52 low-level government can do efficiently should not be
53 transferred to a higher level. What the local government
54 can handle should be left to the local government; what the
55 state can handle should be under state jurisdiction; the

56 federal government should have jurisdiction only over those
57 issues that lower-level authorities cannot handle well. An
58 efficient distribution of issues between the different levels of
59 government should lower the stakes of national politics and,
60 thus, reduce the contentiousness of presidential elections
61 and de-escalate political conflicts in Washington.

62 All in all, my proposals point to “parliamentarizing
63 presidentialism.” Let us change political behavior if the
64 foundations of the institutional system cannot be replaced.
65 The tone may sound like muddling through and kicking
66 the can down the road. This is because I guess that the
67 blockage of the existing political system regarding major
68 legislation is even stronger when it comes to constitutional
69 amendments. But, of course, I salute the debate about
70 more ambitious initiatives for institutional reforms, such
71 as those framed by Maxwell Stearns, which can always
72 serve as a reference for critical comparison.

73
74
75 **Parliamentary America: The Least Radical Means of**
76 **Radically Repairing Our Broken Democracy.** By

77 Maxwell L. Stearns. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023.

78 354p. \$34.95 cloth.

79 doi:10.1017/S1537592724001518

80 — Josep M. Colomer , Georgetown University
81 colomerj@georgetown.edu

82
83 *Parliamentary America* is a highly relevant, timely book
84 about the flaws of the United States political system with a
85 proposal for its transformation. The author, a law profes-
86 sor, makes good use of political economy, social choice
87 theory, and comparative politics to make his case. It
88 certainly is not an “academic” exercise in the bad sense
89 of the word, but it is in the best one. The presentation is
90 didactical, with a practical purpose; for the author, his
91 book is not a “mere thought experiment,” but “deeply
92 personal and existential” (p. 241).

93 I particularly appreciate the diagnosis of the long-term
94 origins of the United States' current institutional and
95 political crisis. Contrary to a broadly shared opinion,
96 Maxwell Stearns holds that the U.S. Constitution does
97 not deserve credit because it has “long outlasted other
98 constitutions through the world” (p. 28). A better expla-
99 nation of its endurance can be found in the country's
100 geopolitical isolation, which avoided military threats and
101 foreign wars on its territory, the long-term experience of
102 slavery, the steady and constant influx of immigrants. “To
103 the extent that the story of our nation is exceptional, it's in
104 spite of, not because of, our constitutional design”, he
105 states (pp. 2-3). In fact, the basic tenets of the
106 U.S. constitutional system—the separation of powers
107 between the legislative and the executive branches along-
108 side congressional elections in single-member districts by
109 plurality rule—have not been replicated anywhere else
110 across the globe.

1 Stearns' analysis and his reform proposals fall along two
2 axes: the electoral rules for the House of Representatives and
3 the relations between Congress and the president, the latter
4 presented as the structure of "presidential accountability."
5 After a summary review of a few major European systems
6 and some variants elsewhere, Stearns basically embraces the
7 model of Germany, a parliamentary multiparty system.

8 In my view, the main deficit of the analysis is its neglect
9 of federalism, which is critical for describing both Ger-
10 many's excellent governance and for explaining the sur-
11 vival of the United States' inefficient constitutional design.
12 We should not take the United States as one more nation-
13 state analogous to the largest countries of Europe. It is a
14 much larger and more diverse federation, a "Union" of
15 preexisting separate states that still now keep vigorous
16 powers and create an asymmetric balance with the federal
17 institutions.

18 Let us start with the House of Representatives. Stearns'
19 proposal is to double its size and replace its electoral system
20 with one of mixed-member proportional representation by
21 which some representatives would keep being elected in
22 single-member districts and others would be elected in
23 larger districts with multiple seats.

24 As the author notes, political scientists like Rein Taa-
25 gepera have shown that the average size of democratic
26 assemblies better fits the cube root of the country's pop-
27 ulation. In 1911, when the U.S. House size was fixed at
28 435 seats, it was an almost exact fit with the nation's cube
29 root. However, it has remained frozen over the last cen-
30 tury, despite the population's further increase.

31 Doubling the number of seats of the U.S. House to
32 870, however, would make it the largest democratic lower
33 chamber in the world, larger than the one in more
34 populous India and than the European Parliament. A
35 major unfortunate consequence would be the infliction
36 of higher costs of organization and decision-making
37 among representatives who would have to multiply their
38 efforts in collecting information, coordinating issues and
39 committees, and negotiating agreements.

40 It may not be merely chance that the House froze its
41 membership at almost exactly the same time as the United
42 States completed its institutionalization of the forty-eight
43 territorially contiguous states. In the complex political
44 structure of the federal United States, the broad decen-
45 tralization into a high number of states has compensated
46 for the federal House's small size and its restrictive political
47 consequences. The very high number of states somehow
48 offsets the limitations of the small federal representation.
49 The effect is extreme in this country, which, with 50 states,
50 is the most decentralized in the world.

51 A logical inference is that an increase in the size of the
52 House would make it more inclusive, with more diverse
53 partisan affiliations, which would push for a stronger
54 federal government. Some issues that are now mainly
55 debated and decided by the state legislatures would be

channeled to Congress as territorial demands by the
additional representatives in Washington. In a long-
durable democracy, the trade-off between the size of the
assembly and territorial decentralization must keep a
consistently bounded relationship. It may not be possible
to significantly alter an institution without affecting the
balance of the other.

According to the "cube root" law, now the House
should have around 700 seats. The proposal of "doubling"
the current size seems to be motivated by Stearns' will to
keep the current 435 single-member districts and to add
the same number in multi-member districts with propor-
tional representation. However, the current single-
member districts could also be kept if as many as 265 seats
by proportional representation were added to fit the
700-seat more manageable size.

To prevent an excessive number of parties from obtain-
ing representation in the federal House on the basis of
peculiar local supports, a national threshold of 5% of the
votes would be required (also like in Germany). However,
research has shown that in a large and diverse country, the
threshold does not have a great influence on the number of
political parties that can enter the assembly, which mostly
depends on the size of the assembly and the average
number of seats in the districts (called "district mag-
nitude").

Taagepera has also provided a formula to estimate this
result in his 2007 book, *Predicting Party Sizes* (Oxford). In
my calculations with that formula, a House with 870 seats
and an average district magnitude of $435/50 = 8.7$ seats
(as the allocation of the number of seats to the parties
would only depend on the proportional segment) would
tend to produce 9.3 parliamentary parties (about half of
them very small). With 700 seats, the average magnitude
would be 5.3 and the subsequent number of parties, 7.8
(also about half very small). In short, in both cases, we
could roughly expect about four major parties with a few
minor ones around. Increasing the size of the assembly by a
smaller amount than Stearns proposes might make only a
relatively small difference in the number of parties, but it
could involve significantly lower organizational and
decision-making costs.

Stearns also proposes a procedure to choose the execu-
tive president and vice president by the House of Repre-
sentatives, which is the essence of a parliamentary regime
as heralded by the book title. Namely, he would expect
either a selection driven by a majority coalition negotiated
among party leaders, or an executive with minority legis-
lative support led by the largest party. In both cases,
Stearns forecasts a "consensus government" based on "a
possible grand coalition that included the now-smaller
Republican and Democratic parties" (p. 281).

A motion of "no-confidence" could remove the presi-
dent and vice president for "mal-administration" (not
needing criminal acts like the current impeachment) if

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

1 supported by 60% of the representatives. Then, he suggests
2 keeping the monarch-ish “line of succession” currently
3 established, instead of the “constructive” censure
4 that leads to investing the leader of the opposition and
5 winner of the censure, as is the case in Germany and other
6 parliamentary countries. As the president and vice presi-
7 dent would keep being elected every four years, and the
8 House every two years, this might increase instability, but
9 the peril is tamed by the innovative requirement that an
10 alternative majority replacing the incumbent should
11 include at least one party member from the overthrown
12 coalition.

13 An inescapable discussion is whether and how these
14 reforms, formally presented as three Constitutional
15 Amendments, could be approved by either two-thirds of
16 the existing Congress or by a Convention called by two-
17 thirds of the states. As the author acknowledges, “the bar is
18 extraordinarily high” (p. 242). He realistically considers
19 that winning support for these reforms among current
20 politicians and public officers will be more important than
21 raising their appeal among citizens. Nevertheless, the
22 author’s list of incentives for supporting the reforms partly
23 relies upon the fact that they might serve as a “pressure
24 release valve” for too busy and overwhelmed incumbent
25 politicians, while he expects they would “empower aspir-
26 ing leaders” without a decision power in the process
27 (pp. 244, 246).

28 Stearns hopes these parliamentary-style reforms would
29 make the United States emerge from the current crisis as “a
30 beacon to other nations” with a “genuine, thriving
31 democracy” (p. 241). Yet he mentions more than once
32 that in the United States we live with “the present past”. I
33 would like to evoke the historical analysis of Nobel
34 laureate Douglass North, who remarked how once ineffi-
35 cient institutions exist, they can reinforce themselves and
36 make their replacement difficult. Restrictive institutions
37 can survive as a consequence of actors’ learning by use,
38 their adaptation to institutional regularities, and the costs
39 of their replacement, as he summarized in his 1990 book,
40 *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perform-*
41 *ance* (Cambridge).

42 Notwithstanding, in the current degraded political
43 environment, Stearns’ ambitious and optimistic proposal
44 for a parliamentary America is pleasantly refreshing and
45 should be a welcome addition to an urgent debate.

46
47
48 **Response to Josep M. Colomer’s Review of**
49 ***Parliamentary America: The Least Radical Means of***
50 ***Radically Repairing Our Broken Democracy***

51 doi:10.1017/S1537592724001658

52  — Maxwell L. Stearns 

53
54 I’m honored by the esteemed Professor Josep Colomer
55 praising *Parliamentary America*. He commends my “good

56 use of political economy, social choice theory, and com-
57 parative politics;” describes the book as “didactical, with a
58 practical purpose” and “academic” in the best sense; and
59 calls my proposals “highly relevant,” “timely,” and “a
60 welcome addition to an urgent debate.”

61 Despite common ground, our differing perspectives
62 emphasize competing concerns. Colomer and I agree
63 two-party presidentialism, replicated nowhere despite its
64 remarkable longevity in the United States, is the root of
65 our constitutional crisis. We agree that where we end up
66 depends on where we started (see his note about “the
67 present past” and Douglass North). And we recognize the
68 need for buy-in among politicians with blocking power.

69 Colomer levels two central criticisms: first, that I treat
70 the United States as “one more nation-state analogous to
71 the largest countries of Europe,” giving inadequate atten-
72 tion to federalism (I don’t), and second, that I contravene
73 the cube-root rule (I do). I criticized Colomer’s *Constitu-*
74 *tional Polarization* for not prescribing a remedy worthy of
75 its bold diagnosis and for embracing proposals that can’t
76 solve the crisis or be enacted. The ultimate question
77 remains: “who’s right?” I remain confident *Parliamentary*
78 *America* makes the stronger case.

79 My virtual world tour—England, France, Germany,
80 Israel, Taiwan, Venezuela, and Brazil—doesn’t treat the
81 United States as any foreign nation. It shows that avoiding
82 the twin threats to democracy—either too few or too many
83 parties—demands revisiting choices along two key demo-
84 cratic axes, namely how we elect the House of Represen-
85 tatives and the manner of presidential selection and
86 accountability.

87 Although my proposals place separation of powers at
88 center stage, they are sensitive to federalism, with discus-
89 sions of these dynamics interspersed throughout. I observe
90 that overcoming the first two constitutional crises trans-
91 formed federal-state relationships (pp. 23–24); that mod-
92 ern affinities are regional (pp. 247–50); and, contrary to
93 Colomer, that U.S. state sovereignty has long been con-
94 strained (p. 248).

95 Federalism rarely defines our most divisive issues—e.g.,
96 guns, racial justice, reproductive rights. But it does play a
97 central role in existing institutional arrangements, explain-
98 ing the Senate’s egregious representational disparities
99 (pp. 247–50). That’s why, despite suggesting possible
100 future Senate reforms (pp. 284–87), my amendments
101 leave that body intact. My proposals will undoubtedly
102 affect federal-state dynamics, but Colomer offers little
103 beyond speculation as to how this threatens *Parliamentary*
104 *America*.

105 Colomer acknowledges the importance of political buy-
106 in for reform but disregards my explanation that the cube-
107 root rule defeats it (pp. 183–84, 250–52). His alternative,
108 adding 265 seats to achieve 700, rather than doubling the
109 size of the House to 870, does as well. Representation
110 demands whole numbers. The party effects of Colomer’s

Critical Dialogue

1	district magnitude calculations are inconsequential.	won't add new constituencies or "territorial demands."	56
2	What's not is allocating 265 seats across fifty states. With	But introducing more, but not too many, parties with	57
3	required equal-population districts, his scheme will intensify	greater discipline counters decision costs, averting unmanageable	58
4	opposition among small states whose populations	administrative burdens.	59
5	disallow more seats. Doubling avoids that.	Professor Colomer's thoughtful review sharpens the	60
6	Colomer disregards that even an 870-member House	debates over reforms claimed to end the threat to	61
7	leaves our constituency-to-representative ratio extraordinarily	U.S. democracy. Along with Colomer, I hope for further	62
8	high globally, beyond India. <i>Parliamentary America</i>	vital conversations.	63
9			64
10			65
11			66
12			67
13			68
14			69
15			70
16			71
17			72
18			73
19			74
20			75
21			76
22			77
23			78
24			79
25			80
26			81
27			82
28			83
29			84
30			85
31			86
32			87
33			88
34			89
35			90
36			91
37			92
38			93
39			94
40			95
41			96
42			97
43			98
44			99
45			100
46			101
47			102
48			103
49			104
50			105
51			106
52			107
53			108
54			109
55			110